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EBAY RX 
Tracy A. Thomas* 
From a remedial perspective, the decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. reopened the age-old 
question of what it means to award equitable relief.1  In eBay, the Court 
rejected a permanent injunction issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit to protect a business-method patent that defendant 
eBay had infringed on its successful auction website.2  This essay 
diagnoses the remedial problem in eBay as the improper use of 
presumptions for equitable relief that effectively prioritizes selected 
legal rights.  It offers a prescriptive cure for the problem in the 
traditional balancing of the equities standard that emphasizes the 
respective equities of the private parties, including their economic 
motivations and inequitable conduct.  This signifies a return to the 
historical notion of equity as a legal accommodation of private and 
public interests in pursuit of justice.3 
REMEDIAL DIAGNOSIS 
The crux of the remedial problem in eBay was the lower courts’ use 
of presumptions to determine injunctive remedies.  As the Court 
previously held, an injunction “is not a remedy which issues as of 
course,” but “only where the intervention of a court of equity is essential 
in order effectually to protect property rights against injuries otherwise 
irremediable.”4  Rather than using this traditional, case-by-case approach 
of determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief, the patent courts 
had adopted categorical rules for granting injunctions.  The district court 
applied a categorical rule against injunctive relief, finding that damages 
                                                          
* Professor of Law, Director of Faculty Research and Development, The University of Akron. 
 1. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006). 
 2. Id. 
         3.    Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944). 
 4. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982) (cited as authority in eBay) 
(quoting Cavanaugh v. Looney 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919)). 
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were generally sufficient to protect a patentee’s rights.5  The Federal 
Circuit applied a contrary presumption in favor of injunctive relief, 
finding it appropriate in most cases to enforce the patent holder’s right to 
exclude competitors.6  Justice Thomas, writing for the eBay majority, 
emphasized repeatedly that the infirmity was the judicial adoption of 
“categorical” rules.7  The use of “broad classifications” and “expansive 
principles” clashed with the Court’s concept of equity as a flexible, case-
by case approach.  Such remedial absolutes of all or nothing at the far 
ends of the remedial spectrum prevented the achievement of remedial 
proportionality by which remedies should be carefully tailored to the 
harm.8 
The danger of a presumption of injunctive relief in the patent 
context is the creation of undue leverage tipping the balance of power.  
As Justice Kennedy explained in his concurrence, “[a]n injunction, and 
the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be 
employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies 
that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.”9 The undue leverage 
requires the defendant to pay excessive fees under threat of going out of 
business.  For example, in the BlackBerry case, a patentee who did not 
practice the patent extorted $612.5 million from the leading firm in the 
wireless e-mail industry (almost 20 times the jury award in the case).10 
The company producing the popular BlackBerry phones paid the 
outrageous settlement when the district court refused to stay an 
injunction against it, which would have forced the company to shut 
down or significantly re-engineer its e-mail service.11 
For Justice Kennedy, this potential misuse of injunctive relief to 
garner excessive power in economic negotiations militated against the 
issuance of injunctions to future patent manipulators.12  As a subsequent 
court noted, “[u]tilization of a ruling in equity as a bargaining chip 
suggests both that such party never deserved a ruling in equity and that 
                                                          
 5. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 713 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
 6. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 7. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1840-41. 
 8. See Tracy A. Thomas, Proportionality and the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence of 
Remedies, 59 HASTINGS L.J.  73, 88 (2007) (hereinafter Remedial Proportionality). 
 9. Id. at 1842. 
       10.  Mike Hughlett & Eric Benderoff, “BlackBerry Suit Settled,” Chicago Trib., Mar. 4, 2006, 
C1. 
 11. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 2d 785 (E.D. Va. 2005). 
 12. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1842.  For a discussion that such undue leverage is nothing new, see 
Gerard Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809 (2007), discussing the “patent sharks” of the nineteenth century. 
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money is all that such party truly seeks.”13  EBay presents a prime 
example of this misuse of equity.  The parties were unable to reach an 
agreement as to the proper payment for eBay’s use of the previously 
unemployed method.  As the district judge noted, he had not seen a more 
hostile set of parties or failure to negotiate a resolution.14  The request 
for an injunction threatened to shut down eBay’s successful Internet 
auction business, thus providing leverage for MercExchange to derive 
higher fees for the use of the patent.  The facts did not necessarily 
support such negotiating power.  In 2004, MercExchange licensed its 
“buy-it-now” patent at issue in the case to uBid, an online auction 
competitor of eBay, for a mere $150,000 plus potential future royalties 
from uBid’s profits.15  In addition, the Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO) reexamined MercExchange’s patents, as requested by eBay, and 
issued non-final actions indicating that both patents were invalid due to 
prior art.16  The automatic injunction at the appellate level skewed the 
negotiating balance between the parties belying the merits or economic 
efficiency of the underlying facts. 
Given these potential problems with injunctions in the patent 
context, the Supreme Court balked at the adoption of a special rule of 
equity for patents that prioritized patent rights above other constitutional, 
statutory, and common law rights.  The gumption of the Federal Circuit 
in unilaterally altering the longstanding common-law principles of 
equity fueled the Court’s criticism.  The traditional principles of equity 
had been expressly incorporated into the Patent Act by Congress, and yet 
the patent courts sought to alter this remedial rule of their own accord.17  
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has shown a propensity for developing its 
own remedial rules, adopting, for example, its own rule for declaratory 
relief.18  The Supreme Court in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc., 
                                                          
 13. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 582 (E.D. Va. 2007) (citing 
Foster v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974) (recognizing that 
equitable relief in the form of an injunction is “not intended as a club to be wielded by a patentee to 
enhance his negotiating stance.”)). 
 14. MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 714. 
 15. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 561, 570. 
 16. Id at 560. 
 17. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2007) (providing that the “courts having jurisdiction of cases under this 
title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any 
right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”).  Cf. CBS Broadcasting, Inc. 
v. EchoStar Communications Corp., 450 F.3d 505, 523 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding that Congress 
intended to mandate injunctive relief in statute which said the, “court shall order a permanent 
injunction barring the secondary transmission by the satellite carrier.”) (emphasis added). 
 18. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 964-65 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that a 
licensee in good standing and not in reasonable apprehension of suit cannot bring a declaratory 
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unanimously struck down this attempt to carve out special remedial 
exceptions for patent law, and chided the Federal Circuit for its remedial 
audacity.19 
There is value, however, in the Federal Circuit’s integrated 
remedial approach, which recognizes the realist insight that a right is 
valued only insofar as its enforcement.  That is, the remedy makes the 
right.  This concept of a unified right in which right and remedy are 
intertwined recognizes that remedies are critical to effectively convey 
the full parameters of the existing right into the real experiences of the 
parties.20  If a patent property right contains the right to exclude, by its 
nature that right should require an injunction to effectuate that exclusion.  
The Supreme Court, however, has failed to adopt this remedial insight of 
the unified right, and has instead proceeded down the path of remedial 
essentialism.21  Remedial essentialism holds that the remedy is separate 
and apart from the right and has no impact upon the valuation of that 
right.22  This essentialism is seen in eBay in the Court’s statement that “a 
right is distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of that 
right.”23  In other words, equity is a freestanding legal construct that 
should not be diluted by interaction with the attendant right. 
Accordingly, the eBay Court emphasized that future patent cases 
must separately focus on the remedy by returning to the “familiar,” 
“well-established,” “traditional” balancing test of injunctions.24  Except 
that the balancing test articulated by Justice Thomas is not so familiar. 
Thomas states the traditional test as requiring the plaintiff to 
demonstrate: 
  (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;  
  (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, 
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; 
                                                          
action to challenge the patent under which it is licensed); Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 
1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that a patent licensee in good standing cannot establish an 
Article III case or controversy with regard to validity, enforceability, or scope of the patent because 
the license agreement “obliterate[s] any reasonable apprehension” that the licensee will be sued for 
infringement.”). 
 19. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007); see also, Dickinson v. Zurko, 
527 U.S. 150 (1999) (overruling the Federal Circuit’s approach that exempted it from the 
Administrative Procedure Act and its rule of deference to agency fact finding). 
 20. Tracy A. Thomas, Congress’ Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 673 (2001). 
 21. Thomas, Remedial Proportionality, supra note 8, at 76-80. 
 22. Id. 
 23. eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006). 
 24. Id. at 1839, 1841. 
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  (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the 
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and  
  (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a 
permanent injunction.25  
Factors one and two of the eBay test distinguish “irreparable injury” and 
inadequacy of monetary damages as two inquiries, although they are 
essentially the same inquiry.26  Irreparability is established by proving 
the inadequacy of damages; thus the second factor merely defines the 
first.  As leading remedies scholar, Professor Doug Laycock explains, 
the eBay test for permanent relief borrows from the four-part test for 
preliminary relief without recognizing or understanding the difference.27  
As the district court stated on remand in the eBay case: “The irreparable 
harm inquiry and remedy at law inquiry are essentially two sides of the 
same coin; however, the court will address them separately in order to 
conform with the four-factor test as outlined by the Supreme Court.”28 
Despite the new arrangement provided by the eBay Court, the 
general parameters of equitable relief and their component parts are  
familiar to litigators.  This familiar ground helps to more clearly 
differentiate the first two prongs of the test.  The common law requires 
first, that an injunction be necessary as demonstrated by the imminent 
threat of future legal harm.29  This element focuses upon the prospective 
factual threat of harm to an existing legal right.  A claim that a defendant 
had designed around a patent, or that the patent validity had been 
                                                          
        25.   eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1839. 
 26. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 87 (2d ed. 1993) (“Many cases have listed both 
inadequate remedy at law and irreparable harm as separate prerequisites to coercive relief.  This 
seems to be an erroneous conflation of the two different kinds of cases, remedial and substantive.”); 
see also James M. Fischer, The “Right” to Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement, 24 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 10 n.38 (2007); Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s 
Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, at 14, ___REV. LIT. ___ (forthcoming) 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1022383.  
 27. Doug Laycock, Remedies in the Legal System and in the Curriculum,___ REV. LIT. ___ 
(forthcoming). In the preliminary context, these two factors have a meaningful difference, as 
plaintiffs must first show likelihood of success on the merits (establishing a threat of legal harm) 
during the pendency of the litigation, and then show the inadequacy monetary remedies.  At the 
stage of permanent relief, the judgment on the merits in favor of plaintiff obviates the need for 
demonstrating such legal harm. 
 28. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 569 (E.D. Va. 2007) (emphasis 
in original). 
 29. DOBBS, supra note 26, at 87, 89 (“the irreparable harm formulation is sometimes used, not 
to compare the legal remedy, but for other purposes, and may be a short (and misleading) way of 
saying that, if the plaintiff seeks a preventive injunction to forestall harm, the threat of harm must be 
real.”). 
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challenged, might defeat the existence of such an imminent threat of 
legal harm.30  The second factor of adequacy would focus upon the 
preference for legal remedies under traditional common law principles.  
Originating from the historical division between law and equity, modern 
injunctions are still disfavored in principle because they restrain 
behavior, thus prohibiting efficient or utilitarian conduct, and carry 
enhanced penalties from the threat of contempt.31  The rules are all there 
in the history and the precedent, but the question remains as to what 
motivations will guide future courts in their application of the black 
letter law.   
PRESCRIPTION FOR RELIEF 
My prognosis is that the future cases of patent injunctions will 
emphasize the balance of the equities and relative fairness as between 
two private parties.  Post-eBay courts have overemphasized the first 
analytical factor of “irreparable injury” despite the irrelevance of that 
factor to the terms of the discussion.32  Instead, courts should situate 
their concerns over bad actors, good faith, and private economic 
consequences within the “balance of hardships” prong.  The balance of 
the equities factor provides analytical room to evaluate the specifics of 
each party in context.  As the Supreme Court noted in Weinberger v. 
Romero-Barcelo, a case it cited in support of its holding in eBay, 
“[w]here plaintiff and defendant present competing claims of injury, the 
traditional function of equity has been to arrive at a nice adjustment and 
reconciliation between the competing claims.”33  This inquiry has the 
capacity to assess the motivations, economic impact, and good faith of 
the parties in determining whether equity will respond with a remedy. 
The balance of the equities factor as articulated by the eBay Court, 
                                                          
 30. Id. 
 31. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 371-73 (3d 
ed. 2002); but see generally DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABILITY INJURY 
RULE (1991) (arguing that the doctrinal adherence to the irreparability injury rule is disproven by 
the practical point that most plaintiffs who request injunctions are awarded such relief). 
 32. See, e.g., MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 500 F. Supp.2d 556, 569-582 (E.D. Va. 
2007); see Jeremy Mulder, Note, The Aftermath of eBay: Predicting When District Courts Will 
Grant Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases, 22 BERK. TECH. L. J. 67, 81 (2007). Approximately 
thirty-three percent of the post-eBay cases have denied injunctions in patent cases.  See 
http://www.thefireofgenius.com/injunctions (web log of Professor Joe Miller tracking post-eBay 
cases); see also, Darryl J. Adams & Victoria Wicken, Permanent Injunctions After eBay v. 
MercExchange: The Year in Review, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 417, 422 (2007) (reporting that 6 of 
23 post-eBay decisions denied requests for permanent injunctions). 
 33. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 
321 US 321, 329 (1949)). 
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requires: “that considering the balance of the hardships between the 
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted.”34  Under 
traditional equitable principles, this balancing test weighs the plaintiff’s 
desire and need for injunctive relief against the defendant’s burden from 
the imposition of the injunction.35  Burden on the defendant from the 
injunction that creates economic waste or substantially disproportionate 
impact can block the issuance of an injunction.36  A party’s bad faith or 
inequitable conduct enters the mix as equitable doctrines of unclean 
hands and estoppel weigh in the balance. 
A focus on the specifics of the private parties parallels the Court’s 
analytical emphasis in other remedial contexts.  Remedial 
proportionality and its requirement of measured relief have become a 
mantra for the U.S. Supreme Court as it has moved towards a universal 
standard of remedial precision.37  In many remedial contexts such as 
injunctions, civil rights remedies, and punitive damages, the Court has 
adopted flexible balancing tests of proportionality in assessing the 
appropriate remedial response.  Proportionality demands remedial 
precision rather than broad, remedial assumptions, and factors in 
considerations of multiple variables of the particular situation.  While on 
its face, a test of proportionality might connote mathematical notions of 
objectivity, it is instead colored by significant judicial subjectivity.38  
This subjectivity, as practiced by the Supreme Court, includes an 
evaluation of the relative merits of the individual players.  In these other 
remedial contexts, it has often been the case that the Court has viewed 
the story as one in which the wrongdoing defendants are the party to be 
protected.39 
Discussions about the relevant private equities are evident in the 
dueling concurrences in eBay.  The two concurrences show that seven 
Justices would resolve future cases of patent injunctions based on the 
depiction of the merits of the respective parties.  Chief Justice Roberts, 
joined by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, thought the balance tipped in 
favor of the patent holders.40  His concurrence focuses on the typical 
patent holder who has designed her patent with the intent of practicing 
                                                          
 34. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).   
       35.    DAVID I. LEVINE, ET AL., REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 96-97 (4th ed. 2006). 
 36. Id. at 97; see, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement. Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872-75 (N.Y. 1970). 
 37. Thomas, Remedial Proportionality, supra note 8, at 2. 
 38. Id. at 38. 
 39. Id. at 30. 
 40. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1841-42; see also John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent 
Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2160 (2007) (arguing in favor of a presumption of injunctive relief 
to patent holders). 
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the invention.  In this case, the law historically has supported the patent 
holder’s right to monopoly by issuing injunctions against infringement.  
In contrast, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and 
Breyer, thought the equitable balance tipped in favor of the company 
commercializing the process.41  For example, he highlights one case of a 
bad plaintiff—the so-called “patent troll.”42  The designation is a 
“nefarious term for businesses that produce no products or services and 
have the sole purpose of obtaining money by licensing patents they own 
and winning infringement lawsuits against others.”43  Patent trolls 
“obtain patents, not to make, use, or sell new products and technologies, 
but solely to force third parties to purchase licenses.  Instead of investing 
capital to develop inventions, patent trolls wait for the industry to utilize 
a patented technology and then enforce their patents.”44 In his 
concurrence, Justice Kennedy recognized that “[a]n industry has 
developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and 
selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”45  He 
expressed concern about a remedial rule that created windfalls to these 
plaintiffs in cases where the patent was only for a business-method 
patent, and “when the patented invention is but a small component of the 
product the defendant company seeks to produce.”46 
Thus, much could turn on whether the plaintiff is cast as a hero or 
villain, for equity will not aid a bad actor.47 When the plaintiff is 
portrayed as a bad actor, like the patent troll, Kennedy suggests no 
injunction should issue.48  Conversely, when the plaintiff is the typical  
good economic actor, like Justice Thomas’s examples of the university 
researcher or self-made inventor, an injunction is likely to issue even 
                                                          
 41. Id. at 1842. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control, 92 A.B.A. J. 50, 53 (Sept. 2006).  The term was first 
used in 2001 by in-house counsel for Intel Corp. to describe the small companies that were suing 
Intel for patent infringement.  Id.  The Federal Trade Commission uses the term “Non-Practicing 
Entity” described as “design firms that patent their inventions but do not practice them or patent 
assertion firms that buy patents from other companies (particularly bankrupt ones) not to practice 
but to assert against others.”  FTC, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and 
Patent Law and Policy 31 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. 
 44. See Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, 10 INTELL. PROP. 
BULL. 1, 1 (2005). 
 45. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 46. Id.; see Seidenberg, supra note 43, at 54. 
       47.   See Roger Young & Stephen Spitz, SUEM—Spitz’s Ultimate Equitable Maxim: In Equity, 
Good Guys Should Win and Bad Guys Should Lose, 55 S.C. L. REV. 175, 186 (2003). 
      48.   eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring); accord, Mark A. Lemley & Carl 
Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2035-39 (2007).   
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where the plaintiff does not intend to commercialize the patent.49  
Similar value judgments about the relative merits of the parties are 
evident in the Patent Act.  For example, Congress has limited the 
remedies for infringement of certain medical process patents, and made 
special provisions for federally-funded patentees.50  In this statutory 
calculus, the infringing defendants are not as bad, and the protected 
patent not as exclusive, as the typical case. 
Yet these characterizations of “good” and “bad” parties in a patent 
dispute are not always self-evident.  For example, Professor James 
McDonough in his article, The Myth of the Patent Troll, has provided an 
alternative narrative by which the patent troll is characterized as a 
productive part of the economy.51  His argument is that “trolls” or patent 
holding companies can serve a valuable function as intermediaries in an 
economy by providing increased efficiency to technology markets.  
Under another view, patent trolls are simply the David to corporate 
Goliaths.  The real bad actors are the “patent pirates” like Microsoft and 
Intel who steal small inventors’ patents when licensing negotiations 
between the parties break down.52  When negotiations fail, the large 
company proceeds to use the new technology without a license, and the 
small inventor is left with no intellectual property and the high-cost of 
patent litigation.53  Injunctive relief can thus provide the added economic 
power to even the stakes against the corporate giant. 
Thus, the characterization of the defendant also becomes subject to 
interpretation. The defendant might be an evil monopolist, or merely a 
humble giant, productively acting in the market economy.54  For the 
humble giant, the undue burden or economic waste caused by the 
injunction to that defendant becomes relevant.55 An evaluation of the 
                                                          
       49.    eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1840. 
 50. Patentability of Inventions and Grant of Patents, Patent Rights in Inventions Made with 
Federal Assistance, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212, 287(c) (2008). 
 51. James F. McDonough, III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the 
Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L. J. 189 (2007). 
 52. Seidenberg, supra note 43, at 51-54. 
 53. Id.; Grant Gross, eBay Patent Ruling Gets Mixed Reviews, InfoWorld, May 16, 2006 
(quoting president of the Professional Inventors Alliance as saying the eBay ruling will “embolden 
the patent pirates”). 
       54.  See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp.2d 1197, 
1221-22 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (granting injunction despite defendant’s incredulous promises to stop 
violation because of bad past conduct of “staggering” amounts of infringement, failure to take steps 
to avoid infringement, and propensity to continue infringement in the future). 
      55.   See, e.g., Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2006 WL 2385139 *6 (E.D. Tex. 2006) 
(denying injunction for patent infringement by Toyota in small component part of hybrid system 
because Toyota was a company of good reputation providing a valuable public service of new 
hybrid cars and technology). 
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relative merits of the defendant’s conduct and intent facilitates the 
efficient breach.  Where the defendant’s use of the patent generates 
profits in excess of the loss caused to plaintiff, the denial of injunctive 
relief will allow for that profit-maximizing behavior to continue.56 
A DIAGNOSTIC CASE 
Decisionmaking that incorporates discussions of the motivations 
and conduct of the private parties is apparent in the decision of the eBay 
dispute on remand.  On remand, the district court denied 
MercExchange’s renewed request for permanent relief on a number of 
grounds, including the adequacy of damages for a plaintiff who was 
primarily interested in extorting money for the unpracticed patent.57  The 
court subsequently awarded MercExchange $25 million in damages, 
which eBay has appealed.58 
 The court’s analysis of equitable relief on remand focuses on prong 
one, the lack of irreparable harm; however, discussions of the parties’ 
motivations, conduct, and status dominate the court’s application of the 
equitable balance.  The court used a searching exploration of the private 
intentions and conduct of the parties to invert the normal David and 
Goliath story of the small inventor against the giant company.  EBay, the 
court found, could have been viewed as a bad actor due to its position as 
an infringing market monopolist.59  The status of monopolist can be a 
categorical type of bad actor as the monopolist’s size and economic 
power can unfairly dominate the market.  EBay’s additional willfulness 
of the infringement also contributed to a negative characterization.60  
The willfulness of eBay’s actions, as demonstrated by its continued, 
post-verdict violation of the injunction, was egregious enough to subject 
it to enhanced damages available to punish or deter such bad conduct.61 
Yet, the court found that the nature of eBay’s market dominance 
                                                          
 56. The unavailability of restitution for patent infringement, in which the infringer’s profits 
cannot be stripped, supports the desirability of efficient breaches of the law in the patent context.  
See Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 506-08 (1964); 7 
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.02[4] (1998). 
 57. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 591 (E.D. Va. 2007).  
MercExchange appealed the denial of injunctive relief.  Notice of Appeal, MercExchange, L.L.C. v. 
eBay Inc., No. 2:01CV00736 (Sept. 4, 2007). 
       58.  Judgment, MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., No. 2:01CV00736 (Dec. 18, 2007); 
Defendant eBay’s Notice of Appeal, MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., No. 2:01CV00736 (Dec. 
31, 2007). 
 59. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d. at 570. 
 60. Id. at 584 n.25, 579-80. 
 61. Id. at 581 n.23, 583. 
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was different than the usual market monopolist because it had not 
flooded the market with a unique product, but rather began its successful 
business prior to the infringement of the MercExchange patent utilizing 
other business methods.62  “[E]Bay is a multibillion dollar corporation 
whose online marketplace brings together tens of millions of buyers and 
sellers around the world, and eBay unquestionably has a substantial 
impact on the United States’ economy, furthermore, eBay’s success pre-
dates its infringement.”63 The burden to eBay from shutting down or 
redesigning its business that had been created prior to the patent 
infringement and which involved other technologies aside from the 
patent appeared significant.  Moreover, the court was concerned about 
the additional unfairness to eBay’s successful business raised by the 
questionable validity of the buy-it-now patent which was up for review 
at the PTO.64 
The district court on remand also characterized the plaintiff, 
MercExchange, as a bad actor lacking good faith in its dealings with 
eBay and the court.  MercExchange, the court noted, “is a company with 
two employees that work out of their homes and appear to specialize in 
litigation and obtaining royalties for licenses based on the threat of 
litigation.”65  The company was portrayed as lurking in the shadows, 
waiting to spring on successful businesses only after they had achieved 
market success.66  The court repeatedly employed estoppel-type 
language to criticize MercExchange for its inconsistent behavior and 
change of position with respect to the request for an injunction.67  It 
noted MercExchange’s failure to request a preliminary injunction, thus 
allowing eBay to continue its business, and prior actions seeking to 
license its product to eBay and other companies as inconsistent with a 
genuine desire to exercise the right to exclude.68  The court also framed 
this argument in terms of waiver, stating that “it was MercExchange that 
                                                          
 62. Id. at 580, 584 n.25. 
 63. Id. at 587. 
 64. It also took notice of the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 
127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007), which in the court’s view, cast even further doubt upon the validity of the 
patent at issue.  MercExchange, 500 F. Supp.2d. at 574, 584.  “Applied to the instant facts, the KSR 
opinion reduces the likelihood that the `265 patent will survive reexamination as the PTO’s prior 
non-final actions were issued prior to KSR, which plainly raised the bar as to what qualifies as non-
obvious.” MercExchange, 500 F. Supp.2d. at 574. 
 65. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 587. 
 66. Id. at 572.  “MercExchange’s modus operandi appears to be to seek out companies that 
are already market participants that are infringing, or potentially infringing, on MercExchange’s 
patents and negotiate to maximize the value of a license.” 
 67. Id. at 569-70, 573 n.14, 582, 585. 
 68. Id. at 582-83. 
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freely chose to repeatedly indicate that it was willing to forgo its right to 
exclude and license its patents to eBay and others.”69 The court also 
mentioned the “suspicious” behavior of MercExchange by “placating” 
the court by drumming up potential companies on remand as a litigation 
tactic to try and show irreparable harm to market share.70  
“MercExchange has attempted to disguise its true motivations to the 
court, claiming that a desire to commercialize guided its decisions, when 
in reality, litigation guided such actions.”71  These private equities 
between the parties were significant to the court, especially when placed 
in the context of the questionable validity of the MercExchange patents 
before the PTO and eBay’s claim to have designed around the patent.  
As illustrated by this case, the balancing of the hardships allows courts 
to delve into the private motivations and possible inequitable conduct of 
the parties with respect to the case at issue in order to resolve the 
injunction dispute as between the two.72 
Other remedies scholars have located the basis for future action in 
patent injunction cases within the remedial adequacy prong of factor 
two.  For example, Professor James Fischer has argued that injunctive 
relief in patent cases should ordinarily be limited to cases when the 
patentee seeks lost profits.73  He believes that damages generally are 
adequate to compensate for certain measures of loss in a patent case, 
namely the loss of license royalties.74  Fischer’s framework for 
individual determination moves beyond the categorical conclusion of the 
eBay district court, which thought that damages might be adequate in all 
patent cases, and tailors it to the specifics of certain kinds of case.  This 
remedial adequacy approach comports with classic remedies principles 
in which the measurability, adequacy, and speculativeness of damages is 
determinative of equity, and was appealing to the district court on 
remand in eBay.75 
                                                          
 69. Id. at 581 (emphasis in original). 
 70. Id. at 570, 577, 584. 
 71. Id. at 577 n. 18. 
 72. The court rejected express defenses of unclean hands hurled by both sides attacking 
allegedly improper trial conduct by each party.  Id. at 587-88.  It found “that neither side has 
particularly clean hands as both have engaged in litigation tactics that at times may have crossed the 
line; however, neither side has successfully proven the other to be unworthy of a ruling in equity 
due to unclean hands.”  Id. at 589.  The court noted a comment by MercExchange’s trial counsel 
that “there is no end to hypocrisy on both sides in litigation, and that is true in every case, and it’s 
certainly not untrue in this case.”  Id. at 590. 
 73. Fischer, supra note 26, at 1; see also Michael W. Carroll, Patent Injunctions and the 
Problem of Uniformity Cost, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 421, 434 (2007). 
 74. Id. 
 75. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
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However, the broader remedial picture suggests that concerns over 
the equitable conduct of the parties and their motivations may ultimately 
be more persuasive to the Supreme Court reviewing questions of 
remedial propriety in patent cases.  EBay provides another piece of the 
larger remedial puzzle by following the Court’s trend towards adopting 
balancing tests to determine measured, proportionate remedial 
responses.  Using the cases of remedial proportionality as a guide, it is 
possible to predict that the Court will be searching for a balanced 
remedial response to patent injunctions as a cure for the disease of 
categorical relief.   
 
                                                          
concurring). (“[L]egal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an 
injunction may not serve the public interest.”).  
